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HENDLER v UNITED STATES: PRESERVING PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE FACE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hendler v. United States I the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit wrestled with the present status of takings jurisprudence. The court found that intrusions 2 of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) upon private property rights constituted
a Fifth Amendment taking. 3 The government may legitimately
seize property in one of two ways: (1) by eminent domain;4 or (2)
by the police powers-based nuisance exception to the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The government action at issue in Hendler II falls into the second category. However,
it does not necessarily follow that a government regulation, even
when set forth as advancing public health, safety, or welfare, will
5
be held as a legitimate exercise of police powers.
The manner in which the court of appeals dealt with the takings issues in Hendler H may signal a growing reluctance by courts
to sanction uninhibited governmental intervention onto private
property without the payment ofjust compensation. 6 Judicial reluctance to sanction governmental intervention is present even
1. 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Hendler II].
2. Hendler IH,952 F.2d at 1376. For a discussion of the particular facts of
Hendler II, see infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
3. Hendler II, 952 F.2d at 1378. For an extensive discussion of the history of
takings jurisprudence and recent developments, see infra notes 7-56 and accompanying text.
4. Eminent domain is the "right of the sovereign, federal or state or an
agency or nominee thereof, to acquire title to property through the process of
condemnation." 5A GEORGE W. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 2575 (1978).
5. Attempts to regulate land use in the name of preventing a public nuisance must survive some qualifying exceptions. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (deprivation of all economic use); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (violation of landowner's
right to exclude); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982) (physical occupation of private property owner's land). Notwithstanding the merit of the purposes behind the disputed regulation, the nuisance
exception cannot be used in these three instances and the government must reimburse the landowner for his loss.
6. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (extensively discussing just compensation); see also William Michael Treanor,
Comment, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
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when the purpose of the intrusion is to cure the land of severe
environmental damage. Such judicial temperament toward regulatory solutions to environmental problems in land use reflects
the importance of and deference to private property rights. This
disposition is significant because courts are willing to defend
traditional private property rights despite the tremendous need
and urgency to clean up the countless environmental tragedies
that have occurred. HendlerII did not resolve the underlying conflict between old legal principles and the relatively recent rise of
environmental law. However, the holding in Hendler II indicates
that private property rights are not dead even though the land
itself might be.
II.

BACKGROUND: STATUS OF PHYSICAL TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
AND ITS RELATION TO REGULATORY TAKINGS

The Fifth Amendment firmly conditions any governmental
taking of private property on the payment ofjust compensation to
the land owner. 7 Early developments in takings jurisprudence involved the formal condemnation of private property by government. 8 The first extension of the takings doctrine out of this
formal context and into the area of "inverse condemnation" 9 ocFifth Amendment, 94 YALE LJ. 694 (1985) (tracing historical development and theoretical underpinnings of just compensation).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment reads in pertinent part
that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.; see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
(requiring compensation for government demand of public easement); Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (requiring compensation for government allowance of cable equipment to be placed on apartment roof); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (entitling owner to
compensation when government seized boat hulls); Narramore v. United States,
960 F.2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (granting owner compensation when water released from government reservoir exceeded amount allowed by easement). This
restriction applies directly to the federal government and indirectly to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
8. See BarbaraJ. Hall, Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New
Directionin Land Use Law?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1570 (1977) (discussing evolution of takings jurisprudence from solely eminent domain cases to also include
regulatory takings cases).
9. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980) (distinguishing formal
condemnation proceedings from inverse condemnation suit). Inverse condemnation is a "shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers
just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings
have not been instituted." Id. at 257. In Clarke, the Court stated, "[A] 'condemnation' proceeding is commonly understood to be an action brought by a condemning authority such as the Government in the exercise of its power of
eminent domain." Id. at 255; see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981) (stating inverse condemnation is "a cause
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curred in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.' 0 In Mahon, a property
owner obtained a decree through a Pennsylvania statute" l to prevent a coal mining company from extracting coal from underneath his land.12 In determining the validity of the decree, the
United States Supreme Court employed a balancing test, weighing the diminution in value of the mining company's property if
forbidden to mine its coal against the legislative objectives and
purposes of the Kohler Act.13 The Court reasoned that since the
public interest in the protection of a single surface rights owner's
house was limited' 4 in comparison to the commercial impracticability to the mining company of removing the coal, the ruling
amounted to a taking entitling the company to compensation. 15
This method of balancing the parties' interests1 6 continued unof action against a government defendant in which a landowner may recover
compensation for a 'taking' of his property under the Fifth Amendment, even
though formal condemnation proceedings . . . have not been instituted by the
government entity.") (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Court asserted that the general rule "is that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 661-672.10 (1966) [hereinafter The Kohler
Act]. The Kohler Act prohibited the removal of anthracite coal if removal would
cause the subsidence of any structure of human habitation. Mahon, 260 U.S. at
412-13. Subsidence is defined as "the lowering of strata overlying a coal mine,
including the land surface, caused by the extraction of underground coal." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987).
12. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412. Mahon owned rights to occupy the surface (the
surface estate), but the coal company owned the right to remove coal from underneath Mr. Mahon's land (the mineral estate). Id. The terms of Pennsylvania
Coal's estate released them from liability with regard to Mahon's estate. Mr.
Mahon, however, feared further extraction of coal would undermine the integrity of the earth supporting his house and result in great damage. Id.
13. Id. The Court framed its argument by acknowledging that when the
diminution in value reached a certain point, it amounted to a governmental exercise of eminent domain. Id. at 413. The public interest in protecting damage
to residences was characterized as a private affair where "the public interest does
not warrant much of this kind of interference." Id. The Court further diminished the public interest argument by maintaining that such an occurrence was
not common and that any safety concerns for surface property owners could be
accomplished by notice. Id. at 413-14. Justice Holmes classified the law as "limited" since it did not apply to mining interests that owned surface rights and
since it undercut basic property concepts. Id. at 414.
14. Id. at 413-14. The Court reasoned that if upheld, the statute would
unconstitutionally strip Pennsylvania Coal of its property rights in the mineral
estate. Id. at 414-15. The Court had little sympathy for Mr. Mahon and contended that he should have had more foresight when purchasing the property.
Id. at 415. Moreover, the Court did not want to extend such rights to a property
owner based on the principle that one should not be able to secure greater property rights than were originally purchased. Id. at 416.
15. Id. at 416.
16. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (uphold-
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17
changed for over fifty years.
The Court reformed its method of inquiry in Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. City of New York.' 8 In Penn Central, a local zoning ordinance prevented the owner of Grand Central Terminal,
the Penn Central Transportation Company, from erecting a fiftyfive story office tower on top of the station. 19 The ordinance was
found not to be a taking, thus barring compensation for any diminution in economic value resulting from the regulation. 20 The
2
Court stressed that takings inquiries were essentially "ad hoc" '
and that "no set formula" could be applied to ascertain whether a
taking had occurred. 2 2 The determination that a taking had transpired was made by inspecting: (1) the character of government
action; (2) the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the
property owner; and (3) the economic impact of such regulations. 23 This three-prong test employed by the Penn Central Court
presented a more complex formula for takings jurisprudence.
This heightened level of analytical complexity has managed to
produce perplexing holdings in subsequent applications.
In contrast to Penn Central, the Court found in favor of private
property rights in Kaiser Aetna v. United States. 24 In Kaiser Aetna, a

ing prohibition on further commercial use of gravel pit as constitutional); Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (finding uncompensated destruction of cedar
trees to save apple orchards constitutional).
17. For a discussion of the developments in this area, see infra notes 18-56
and accompanying text.
18. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
19. Id. at 110. New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law restricts
changes to buildings deemed historic and is administered by the 11 member
Landmarks Preservation Commission. Id. The determination of a site as historic is subject to scrutiny by the New York City Board of Estimate and then to
judicial review. Id. After designation as an historical site, the owner must keep
the exterior features in good repair and submit changes to the Commission for
approval. Id. at 111-12.
20. Id. at 138. The Court reasoned that although the air space above the
terminal was a valuable property interest, the restrictions did not destroy the
owner's primary expectations in the property or significantly diminish its value.
Id. at 130-31, 136. The Court explained the genesis and importance of such
regulations and their widespread use throughout the country to protect the historical and aesthetic value of various landmarks. Id. at 107-08. The Court expressed a great fear that if it invalidated this law, similar statutes preserving
landmarks would be in jeopardy. Id. at 131.
21. Id. at 124.
22. Id. The Court stated that "this Court

. . .

has been unable to develop

any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government,
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
23. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
24. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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marina owner's right to compensation was upheld when the federal government mandated public access to its property. 25 The
Court analyzed the character of the government's action and determined that, although the federal government had navigable
servitude over the property,2 6 requiring the owner to admit the
public exceeded the regulation's necessary scope. This governmental intrusion had gone too far and was deemed a violation of
the owner's foremost right to exclude others, 2 7 thus qualifying
28
the owner for compensation.
The Kaiser Aetna Court's identification of the right to exclude
others from one's property reflects how property rights are actually a collection or bundle of rights in which certain sticks deserve
greater court protection. For example, the right to exclude will
be guarded more diligently than other less important or less fun29
damental property rights, such as development.
25. Id. at 180. The lagoon was private property and not accessible from the
waterways of Hawaii until the owner dredged and connected it with the navigable waters of Hawaii. Id. at 165-66.
26. Id. at 174. The Court has previously described the concept of navigable
servitude as follows:
"All navigable waters are under the control of the United States for the
purpose of regulating and improving navigation, and although the title
to the shore and submerged soil is in the various States and individual
owners under them, it is always subject to the servitude in respect of
navigation created in favor of the Federal government by the
Constitution."
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 635 (1912) (quoting Gibson v.
United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-72 (1897)). The Court in Kaiser Aetna determined that the federal government had a navigable servitude over the marina
because it fell "within the definition" of navigable waters. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S.
at 172.
27. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80. The right to exclude was found to be
"universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right." Id.; see also
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)
(stating that right to exclude is one of most essential property rights). For a
further discussion of Loretto and the right to exclude others from property, see
infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
28. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 180. The Court categorized Kaiser Aetna as "not
a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner
that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property;
rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude . . . will result in an actual
physical invasion of the privately owned marina." Id. Justice Rehnquist, ruling
that the marina's owners were entitled to just compensation, stated that the regulation went "so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation
as to amount to a taking." Id. at 178.
29. Id. at 179-80. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926) (holding zoning as noncompensable constitutional taking). The Court's
analysis was significant as a harbinger of the present Supreme Court's conceptualization of property as a bundle of sticks. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
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Despite its advancement of the method of takings analysis it
30
formulated in Penn Central, the Court, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,
created yet another test. The Agins Court declared that a taking
occurred if either the regulation failed to advance a legitimate
state interest or denied the property owner the economic viability
of the property. 3 ' The Agins Court held that the particular zoning
ordinance3 2 advanced the legitimate government interest of promoting open space. 33 The owner was not denied enjoyment of
the economic viability of his property because the property's best
possible use, residential development, was still available. 34 The
Court did not find in favor of the private property owner in Agins
because the regulation did not interfere with a paramount stick in
the bundle of rights. 35 Notwithstanding the public importance of
regulations enacted under the nuisance exception to the Fifth
Amendment, 36 the right to exclude would not be the only paramount stick in the bundle of rights.
Indeed, the Court defined another such paramount stick in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.3 7 A local cable company, pursuant to a New York law, 38 installed two metal boxes
and some cable on the roof of an apartment building. 39 The
30. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
31. Id. at 260.
32. Id. at 257. California enacted a statute requiring municipalities to plan
the land use and open-space development of their communities. CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 65302(a), (e) (West Supp. 1979). The City of Tiburon responded with
ordinances which prevented the property owner from constructing more than
five residential dwellings and mandated open-space use of the land. Agins, 447
U.S. at 257-59 (citing Tiburon, Cal., Ordinances Nos. 123 N.S. and 124 N.S.
(June 28, 1973)).
33. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261-62. The regulations were held to serve the legitimate governmental purposes of "discourag[ing] the 'premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban uses.' " Id. at 261 (quoting CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 65561(b) (West Supp. 1979)).
34. Id. at 262.
35. For further discussion of the concept of property rights as a bundle, see
infra note 128 and accompanying text.
36. The nuisance exception to the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation
Clause is "a narrow exception allowing the government to prevent 'amisuse or
illegal use' " of property. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 512 (1987) (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)). The
scope of the exception does not reach to include "the prevention of a legal and
essential use" of the property. Curtin, 222 U.S. at 86.
37. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
38. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 828 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). The law states
that a landlord may not " 'interfere with the installation of cable television facilities upon his property or premises.' " Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423 (quoting N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 828 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)).
39. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 422. The cable company installed " 'a cable slightly
less than one-half inch in diameter and of approximately 30 feet in length along
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Court held that despite the size of the intrusion, its permanence
made it a taking. 40 Thus, the Court identified the right against
permanent physical occupation of private property via regulation
as a preeminent property right worthy of protection.
In 1987, the Court wrestled four times with takings jurisprudence 4 ' and revisited the right to exclude. 4 2 In Nollan v. California
the length of the building about 18 inches above the roof top, and directional
taps, approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches, on the front and rear of the
roof.'" Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423
N.E.2d 320, 324 (N.Y. 1981)).
40. Id. at 434-35. The Court said that "when the 'character of governmental action' is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly
have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether
the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic
impact on the owner." Id. (citing and quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
41. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987);
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). For a full discussion of Nollan, see infra
notes 43-49 and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of First English,
see infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
In Keystone, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute, the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act, which devised formulas to ensure that proper surface support is provided to property under which mining occurs. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406
(1986). These restrictions prevented a coal mining company from extracting
coal from its property. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493. The Subsidence Act has public
safety goals similar to those of the Kohler Act scrutinized in Mahon. For a discussion of the Kohler Act, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Much debate occurred as to the degree of Keystone's injuries resulting from
the denial of access to the unextracted coal. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493-99. The
Court assessed the amount of coal that had to be left in the mines in relation to
all of Keystone's mines. Id. at 493-97. Keystone had argued that the unaccessible coal was an estate in and of itself and should not be viewed in relation to
all of its mines. Id. at 499. The Court rejected this argument outright. Id. at
500-02. Instead, the Court opted for a harm/benefit analysis and invoked a nuisance exception to takings doctrine to justify the regulation. Id. at 491-93.
"Courts have consistently held that a State need not. provide compensation
when it diminishes or destroys the value of property by . . .abating a public
nuisance." Id. at 492 n.22 (citations omitted). The Court also pointed out that
its decision was not solely based on the nuisance exception. Id. at 492-93. The
second prong of the Agins test, the denial of economically viable use of the property to the property owner, was used to assert that regardless of the regulation
protecting the public from nuisances, the damage to the property owner did not
rise to a sufficient level. Id. at 493-99. For further discussion of Keystone, see
Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1603-04 (1988)
(describing 1987 developments in takings analysis including Keystone).
In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), the Court invalidated a federal
statute which provided for certain Indian lands to escheat to the tribe rather
than descend or be devised. Id. at 709. The statute reads in pertinent part:
No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land
within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent [sic] by intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that
tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage
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CoastalCommission,43 the Court engaged in a more stringent review
of a California commission's actions when it conditioned a property owner's desire to rebuild his beachfront house upon his donation of a public easement facilitating access to the beach. 4 4 A
bolder approach was taken by the Court in scrutinizing the stated
purpose of the easement, which was to prevent the visual blockage of the shore. 4 5 This blockage would psychologically prevent
the public from realizing the stretch of coast nearby, according to
46
the commission.
The Nollan Court ruled that the conditional nature of the
easement did not justify the governmental intrusion any more
47
than an outright governmental demand for the easement.
in such tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to escheat.
25 U.S.C. § 2206(a) (1983). While the Court acknowledged the federal government's interest in preventing the fractionalization of Indian lands, it held that
the outright restriction on the descent or devise of such land by denying a basic
property right amounted to a taking and entitled the plaintiffs to compensation.
Hodel, 481 U.S. at 712. The government's interest in promoting the Indian
tribe's more efficient and productive use of their ancestral lands was recognized
and the "administrative headache" for the government to oversee these fragmented interests was also acknowledged. Id. at 712-13. For example, one tract
of land had 439 owners, two-thirds of which were entitled to less than $1 per
year with the smallest heir receiving one cent every 177 years. Id. at 713; see also
Michelman, supra, at 1606.
42. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831. In Kaiser Aetna, the Court set out the right to
exclude as a paramount stick in the bundle of property rights. Kaiser Aetna, 444
U.S. at 179-80. For further discussion of the right to exclude, see supra notes 2429 and accompanying text.
43. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
44. Id. at 828. The property owner leased the property with an option to
buy. Id. at 827. That option was conditioned on the Nollans demolishing the
present residential structure and replacing it. Id. at 827-28. Any development
on the oceanside required the approval of the California Coastal Commission.
The application to rebuild was denied unless the Nollans agreed to donate a
public easement on the side of the property so that the public would have
greater access to the beach. Id. at 828.
45. Id. at 828. Michelman noted the change in scrutiny from a surface
"means-end" plausibility analysis to a sharper analysis of the "instrumental efficacy." Michelman, supra note 41, at 1607; see also Randall T. Shepard, Land Use
Regulation in the Rehnquist Court: The Fifth Amendment and Judicial Intervention, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 847 (1989) (discussing changed approach of Supreme Court).
This differing approach represented a departure from a rational basis analysis to
one of strict scrutiny.
46. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29. The commission was also concerned with
establishing a precedent for increasing private use of the California shoreline.
Id. at 829.
47. Id. at 831. The Court explained:
Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement
across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in
order to increase public access to the beach, rather than conditioning
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Moreover, the Court, specifically applying the Agins test, found
that the requested easement did not advance any legitimate government purpose and thus constituted a taking. 48 Most importantly, however, the easement was characterized as a permanent
49
physical invasion.
In First English EvangelicalLutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 50 another of the 1987 cases, a local ordinance effectively forbade a church from rebuilding its campground because it was
located on a flood site. 5 1 After deciding that a taking had occurred, 52 the Court addressed whether compensation was due to
the church for the period prior to the Court's determination that
the regulation amounted to a taking. 53 Since the Fifth Amendment is self-executing 5 4 and the characterization of the intrusion
as permanent or temporary in this case was insignificant, 5 5 the
56
church was entitled to compensation.
The status of takings jurisprudence regarding regulations
their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing to do so, we have
no doubt there would have been a taking.
Id.
48. Id. at 837. The condition "utterly fails to further the end advanced as
the justification for the prohibition." Id. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
analogized this restriction to forbidding people from yelling "fire" in a crowded
theater unless they were willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury. Id.
49. Id. at 838. The Court held that the continuous access across the Nollan
property constituted a permanent invasion. Id.
50. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
51. Id. at 307. The church's campground in Mill Creek Canyon was flooded
and all buildings were destroyed in 1978. Id. In reaction to this flood, Los Angeles County sought to prevent any further destruction in Mill Creek Canyon by
passing an ordinance. Id. County of Los Angeles Interim Ordinance No. 11,855
provided that " '[a] person shall not construct, place or enlarge any building or
structure, any portion of which is, or will be, located within the outer boundary
lines of the interim flood protection area in Mill Creek Canyon.' " Id. at 307
(quoting City of Los Angeles Interim Ord. No. 11,895 (1979)). This regulation
had the effect of preventing the church from rebuilding its campground facilities. Id.
52. Id. at 312.
53. Id. at 315-19.
54. Id. at 315. "A landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a result of 'the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation.' " Id. (citations omitted).
55. First English, 482 U.S. at 318. The Court reasoned that temporary takings denying "a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from
permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation."
Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 322. The Court also acknowledged that this decision would impact future land planning when it said that "our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and
governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations." Id. at 321.
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that result in either a permanent physical occupation of private

property or an interference with the right to exclude others from
one's property remains in favor of the private property owner.
However, the tremendous public interest in environmental regulation of land use and the abuses of the last thirty years have created imperative pressure to alter the present deference to
property owners. Notwithstanding a paramount stick in the bundle of rights, critically important environmental concerns may
need to take precedence. Although the Supreme Court has yet to
be presented with such a question, a recent Federal Circuit case
has grappled with the issue.
III.

FACTS

The dispute in Hendler II originated through the discovery by
federal and state officials that pollutants, contaminants, and hazardous substances had seeped into the groundwater table from a
toxic waste dump known as the Stringfellow Acid Pits. 57 This
hazardous waste site was located near plaintiffs' property, 58 and
the migratory plume of contaminants in the water table
59
threatened a major basin for agricultural and drinking water.
EPA determined that the best strategy to track the movement of
the contaminants was through the placement of groundwater
monitoring wells on the toxic waste site and on the surrounding
60
parcels of privately owned property.
After EPA failed to have the plaintiffs voluntarily acquiesce to
the installation of the wells, 6 1 the Agency acted pursuant to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabilities Act 6 2 and issued an Order 6 3 requiring the plaintiffs to allow
57. Hendler v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 91, 93 (1986) [hereinafter Hendler

I].
58. Id. at 93.

59. Id. The Chino III Groundwater Basin supplies drinking water for the
public and water to farmers for agricultural business in the Riverside County
area. Id.
60. Hendler 1I, 952 F.2d at 1367.
61. Hendlerl, 11 Cl. Ct. at 93. The plaintiffs refused to allow the installation
of wells or presence of EPA officials on the premises. Id.
62. CERCLA §§ 101-157, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
EPA utilized §§ 104 and 106 to gain access to the Hendler property. Hendler I,
11 Cl. Ct. at 93-94. Section 104 states:
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a
substantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is
a release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any
pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is authorized
to act . . . to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for
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wells to be installed. Under the threat of civil penalties, including
punitive damages, the Order also required the plaintiffs to allow
64
government contractors unimpeded access onto their property.
Shortly after the Order was issued, EPA had five wells placed on
the plaintiffs' property and the State of California later installed
65
thirteen more wells.

The plaintiffs filed their original complaint in September
1984, alleging that EPA's actions constituted a taking and warranted compensation of $4.5 million. 6 6 After stipulating that
there were no issues of material fact, 67 both parties filed for summary judgment. 68 The United States Claims Court in Hendler 169
ruled in favor of EPA and California on two of the three
remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant at any time ....
CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a). Section 104(b) provides that if the
President is authorized to act under 104(a) then the President may:
undertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other
information gathering as he may deem necessary or appropriate to
identify the existence and extent of the release or threat thereof, the
source and nature of the hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants involved, and the extent of danger to the public health or welfare
or to the environment.
CERCLA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b).
Section 106(a) authorizes the President to "take other action . . . including
... issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare
and the environment." CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
63. HendlerI, 11 Cl. Ct. at 93. EPA's Order stated in relevant part that EPA
and state officials as well as authorized personnel (i.e. contractors) be given:
*:
A. Access to [plaintiffs' property] for the following purposes: (1)
locating[,] constructing, operating, maintaining, and repairing, monitor/extraction wells; (2) taking measurements and samples from those
wells; (3) performing groundwater extraction operations ...

including

off-site disposal of such extracted groundwater.
C. Access to [plaintiffs' property] to conduct any and all other activities necessary to investigate, monitor, survey, test and perform information gathering to identify the existence and extent of the release
of hazardous substances or the threat thereof, the source and nature of
the hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants involved, and the
extent of the danger to the public health or welfare or to the
environment.
Id. (quoting EPA's administrative Order to plaintiffs issued on Sept. 20, 1983)
[hereinafter EPA's Order].
64. Id.
65. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1369-70. The court described the wells as "some
100 feet deep, lined with plastic and stainless steel, and surrounded by gravel
and cement. Each well was capped with a cement casing lined with reinforcing
steel bars, and enclosed by a railing of steel pipe set in cement." Id. at 1376.
66. Id. at 1370.
67. Id.
68. Id. The trial judge determined that the summary judgment motions
presented three issues: first, whether EPA's Order facially was a taking; second,
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grounds. 70 After this decision, battles over discovery ensued and
significant delays resulted before the court of appeals ruled on
7
the case. '
IV. ANALYSIS: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S AVOIDANCE OF
REGULATORY TAKINGS ANALYSIS AND EMBRACEMENT OF PER
SE PHYSICAL TAKINGS ANALYSIS

The Federal Circuit Court began its analysis in Hendler II by
providing a background survey of takings jurisprudence and
philosophy. 72 The court traced the theoretical developments
from feudal England 73 through the early years of the United
States when takings were considered limited to physical intrusions onto property by the government.7 4 The court acknowlwhether EPA's physical occupation of the Hendler property was a taking; and
third, whether the activities of California were attributable to EPA. Id.
69. 11 Cl. Ct. 91 (1986).
70. Id. at 100. The court ruled in favor of EPA on the issues of a taking
based solely on the Order and the implication of EPA for the actions of California. Id. The issue of whether a physical taking occurred was left for trial. Id. at
98.
71. Hendler II, 952 F.2d at 1369-70. The discovery battle lasted nearly four
years and proceeded as follows:
December 1985-EPA motion to compel Hendler to answer interrogatories granted by Claims Court.
March 1986-EPA moved a second time to compel Hendler to answer
interrogatories granted by Claims Court.
January 1987-Second EPA motion granted.
March 1987-EPA moved for dismissal.
March 26, 1987-Plaintiffs respond to interrogatories and EPA moved
again for dismissal.
April 1987-EPA moved a third time to compel plaintiffs' response to
interrogatories.
May 14, 1987-Plaintiffs responded again to interrogatories.
May 26, 1987-EPA moved for a third time for dismissal.
August 1987-Claims Court finally ordered discovery closed.
October 1987-New judge appointed to handle case.
September 1988-Plaintiffs moved to suspend based on evidence of a
new type of well to be installed by EPA.
September 1989-EPA motion to dismiss granted.
Id.
72. Id. at 1371-74.
73. Id. at 1371. The court drew the distinction between England, where the
sovereign determined when land would be taken for public purposes, and the
United States, where "the Constitution does not leave that issue to the sovereign's good will." Id.
74. Id. at 1371. The court pointed out that little scrutiny was given to the
purposes of such governmental intrusions, but that the main concern was the
amount of compensation due to the property owner. Id. It was also noted that
occasionally the issue became whether the government's occupation was so
short-lived as to not constitute a taking. Id. The distinction was drawn between
situations where "the government vehicle parked one day on O's land while the
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edged the challenges in analyzing twentieth century government
regulatory actions. The key question in the analysis, until 1978,
was whether government regulations went too far. 75
The court of appeals noted an increased involvement by the
Supreme Court in the takings area since the 1978 decision in Penn
Central.76 The Penn Central three-pronged test 7 7 was characterized
as "more elaborate-but perhaps no more certain" than the
Mahon test. 78 The court, via Judge Plager's opinion, portrayed
the Supreme Court as avoiding the issue of whether property
owners are entitled to compensation for the duration of overly
intrusive regulations 7 9 until First English.s0 Further exploration
into what constituted a regulatory taking was deemed unnecessary by the court.8 ' The court concluded by articulating that the
core premise in its analysis is that government cannot take the
essential economic value of one's property away through
driver eats lunch, on one hand, and the entry on O's land by the government for
the purpose of establishing a long term storage lot for vehicles and equipment,
on the other .... Id. The court noted that the former situation was clearly not
a taking, but the latter certainly fell in the range of takings. Id.
75. Id. at 1372. The court gleaned the test from Justice Holmes' oft-cited
quote in Mahon that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The court drew the
conclusion from analyzing various zoning cases. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (invalidating zoning ordinance); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding particular zoning ordinance
but leaving door open for some to be overly intrusive). The court also considered the Supreme Court's deference to state court determinations on the validity of zoning ordinances. See Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky.
1961) (negating zoning ordinance for its lack of master plan and spotty application); Kropfv. City of Sterling Heights, 215 N.W.2d 179 (Mich. 1974) (granting
local government deference in zoning).
76. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For further discussion of Penn Central, see supra
notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
77. For an enumeration and discussion of Penn Central's three-prong test,
see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
78. Hendler 11, 952 F.2d at 1372. For a discussion of the Mahon balancing
test, see supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
79. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1372-73. The court of appeals stated that the
Supreme Court passed on the question in four different cases: MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); and Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
80. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987). The court acknowledged that government must compensate property owners for the entire duration of their intrusion. Hendler H, 952
F.2d at 1373.
81. Hendler 1I, 952 F.2d at 1373. The court remarked that "we need not
explore in detail the various articulations of what constitutes a regulatory taking
.... Id..
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regulation.
The court then bifurcated its taking analysis, first exploring
EPA's and California's actions as a regulatory taking.8 3 Second,
the court treated the federal and state actions as a traditional
84
physical taking.
A.

Government Actions as a Regulatory Taking

In analyzing EPA's actions as a regulatory taking, the court of
appeals quickly chastised the Claims Court for what it perceived
to be an outright misreading of the Fifth Amendment.8 5 The
lower court had held that EPA's Order was not a taking because
its terms were consistent with simultaneous use of the property by
86
EPA and Hendler.
Judge Plager adamantly declared that "[t]he government
does not have the right to declare itself co-tenant-in-possession
with a property owner." 8 7 Using Nollan8 8 for support, the court
viewed the right to exclude others as one of the prized rights in a
property owner's bundle of rights.89 In addition to the constitu82. Id. The court said that "the government, under the guise of regulation,
cannot take from a property owner the core economic value of the property,
leaving the owner with a mere shell of shambled expectations." Id.
83. Id. at 1374-75. For a discussion of the court's regulatory takings analysis, see infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
84. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1375-78. For a further discussion of the court's
physical takings analysis, see infra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
85. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1374. For discussion of the court of appeals criticisms, see infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
86. Hendler II, 952 F.2d at 1374. The Claims Court described EPA's Order
as follows:
[It] did not purport to dispossess plaintiffs or limit their use of the
property. It was not functionally equivalent to seizure of the property
or restraint on entry and use. While [the Order's] terms were expansive, they were not necessarily inimical to simultaneous use of the property by plaintiffs, as long as they did not interfere with defendant's
admittedly beneficent activities. As a matter of fact, the property was
underdeveloped and unused, so there was no possibility of conflict between the order and the plaintiff's use.
Hendler I, 1 I Cl. Ct. at 95.
87. Hendler II, 952 F.2d at 1374.
88. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
89. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1374. The court stressed the importance of this
private property right by expressing sentiments such as the following: "In the
bundle of rights we call property, one of the most valued is the right to sole and
exclusive possession-the right to exclude strangers, or for that matter friends,
but especially the Government." Id.; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985) ("[The] right to exclude ... is but the
essence of the concept of property."); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (declaring right to be let alone among citizen's most cherished rights). See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
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tional basis for this right, 9 0 the importance of exclusive ownership
for economic development and efficiency was highlighted by the
court. 9 1 The court was quick to point out that whether the breach
of the plaintiffs' exclusive ownership was perpetrated by a governmental authority or private group was of no significance. 9 2 In
fact, the opinion even hinted that such infringements by governmental authorities should be met with greater scrutiny. 93
The court of appeals agreed with the lower court's finding
that the Order alone did not constitute a taking.94 Nonetheless,
considering the character of the government's actions after the
issuance of the Order and the plaintiffs' investment-backed expectations, the plaintiffs may have suffered sufficient economic
impact to warrant compensation.9 5
B.

Government Actions as a Physical Taking

The court next explored whether the actions of state and federal officials constituted a traditional physical taking. 9 6 The examination focused on the wells installed on the property9 7 in light
of Loretto's9 8 assertion that permanent physical occupation of
one's property is a taking. 9 9 First, the court examined whether
the actions of EPA and California amounted to a permanent inU.S. 825, 831 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458

U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
90. For further discussion of the basis of the right to exclude, see supra
notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
91. Hendler 11, 952 F.2d at 1375.
92. Id.
93. Id. The court announced:
The intruder who enters clothed in the robes of authority in broad
daylight commits no less an invasion of these rights than if he sneaks in
in the night wearing a burglar's mask. In some ways, entry by the
authorities is more to be feared, since the citizen's right to defend
against the intrusion may seem less clear. Courts should leave no
doubt as to whose side the law stands upon.
Id.
94. Id. The court felt that the plaintiffs did not specifically plead the facts
necessary to make out such a case. Id.
95. Hendler 11, 952 F.2d at 1375. The court interpreted the Claims Court's
silence on this issue to mean that it was to be held over for trial. Id.
96. Id. at 1375-78. For more discussion of physical takings, see supra notes
37-40 and accompanying text.
97. For a description of the wells placed on the Hendler property, see supra
note 65.
98. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
For a review of the Loretto case, see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
99. Hendler11, 952 F.2d at 1375. The court reiterated that, regardless of the
governmental purpose or how minimal the economic detriment to the property
owner is, the occupation constituted a taking. Id.
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trusion. I0 0 Justice Thurgood Marshall's rhetoric in Loretto was
commandeered to establish that the character of the government's actions is "determinative" in such cases.' 0 ' "Permanent"
was clarified as not being forever and several cases were cited to
02
support that proposition.
In applying the law to the present case, a common sense approach was employed to discount the possibility that this taking
was temporary. The court expounded on the obtrusive nature of
the wells,' 0 3 comparing the intrusion to that of the cable television equipment in Loretto. 10 4 Judge Plager then delineated the
limits of temporary takings by referring to an earlier hypothetical
regarding a truckdriver parking briefly on one's property to eat
lunch.' 0 5 The court hastened to note that it was not asserting
what the boundaries for a Loretto permanent physical invasion
were, but that this case certainly fit within the ambit of such
06
parameters.
The meaning of "permanent" was then explicitly qualified to
include the periodic traffic of government vehicles onto the plaintiffs' property. 0 7 The court noted that the physical occupation
08
need not be "exclusive, or continuous and uninterrupted."'1
0
9
The right to exclude, strongly expressed in Kaiser Aetna,'
was
100. Id. at 1376-77.
101. Id. at 1376 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426).
102. Id. The following cases were found as illustrative of how government
action can constitute a compensable taking: Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (government appropriation of private business for
public use during World War II); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372
(1946) (government acquired remainder of lease for building); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (government appropriation of warehouse lease).
103. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1376.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1371, 1377.
106. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1377. The court reasoned, "It is enough to say
...
that the occupancy by the Government was comfortably within the degree
necessary to make out a taking." Id.
107. Id. EPA and state officials traveled onto the Hendler property to check
and maintain the wells. Id. at 1367, 1377.
108. Id. at 1377.
109. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). The court also relied on Justice Scalia's opinion
in Nollan for support:
To say that the appropriation of a public easement across a landowner's
premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest but rather
..."a mere restriction on its use," is to use words in a manner that
deprives them of all ordinary meaning ....

We have repeatedly held

that. . . "the right to exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.' "
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32 (citations omitted) (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433).
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invoked to display that the intrusions by government officials
amounted to takings."10 The court stated that the government
acted in this case as if it had acquired an easement over the Hendler property, and thus the use of KaiserAetna was appropriate.'
C.

The Holding of Hendler H

The court explicitly declared that the government interest to
monitor the groundwater easily overcame the plaintiffs' property
rights. 1 2 However, the government actions amounted to a taking
and compensation was warranted." 3 The court ruled that the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in Hendler 1' 4 was improperly denied." 5 The issues of whether EPA could be held liable for the actions of California officials' " 6 and the efficacy of the
discovery procedure ' 7 were also resolved.
110. Hendler 1, 952 F.2d at 1377.
111. Id. at 1378.
112. Id. The plaintiffs agreed that the government had a valid interest in
monitoring their property. Id.
113. Id. The court cited the obtrusiveness of the wells, the duration of their
presence on the property, and the indignation of government officials, entering
the property at their convenience, as factors for finding a permanent physical
occupation of the property. Id.
114. See Hendler I,11 Cl. Ct. 91 (1986).
115. Hendler 11, 952 F.2d at 1378. For a discussion of the reasons behind
the Claims Court's rulings on the summary judgments, see supra notes 66-70 and
accompanying text.
116. Hendler 11, 952 F.2d at 1378-79. The court decided that EPA could be
held responsible for the actions of California officials. Id. at 1379. Common law
agency was eliminated as a basis for holding EPA responsible, instead California
officials were viewed as acting under the power of CERCLA. The court reasoned that EPA officials could not have acted or issued an executive order without the proper legislative authority. Id. at 1378. Additionally, the Order itself
authorized "EPA officials and other authorized personnel, including state officials." Id. at 1379 (citing Hendler I, 11 Cl. Ct. at 93). Therefore, the actions of
state officials were done under the authority of the federal government through
CERCLA and the EPA Order. Id. at 1378.
117. Id. at 1380-84. The court ruled that the controversial responses to
EPA's interrogatories were not deserving of the lower court's rancor because
either they were sufficient or EPA had the answers to such questions in their
possession. Id. at 1380-82. The imposition of Rule 37 sanctions was held to be
too harsh, as well as invalid, because of the skewed analysis that resulted after
the Claims Court's erroneous denial of Mr. Hendler's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether there was a physical taking by EPA and the state of
California. Id. at 1382-84.
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V. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION: QUESTIONABLE
APPLICATION OF PHYSICAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE AND THE EASY
WAY OUT ON REGULATORY TAKINGS ANALYSIS
In Hendler II, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals executed a
laudable summary of the murky area of regulatory takings."t 8 Its
application of takings jurisprudence to this case, however, was
terse and unclear. The court passed on an obvious opportunity
to sufficiently and precisely guide future courts in pondering critical takings issues.
The court, following the lead of FirstEnglish, properly tolled
the period for which the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation
as being from the start of the governmental intrusion,'1 9 The
declaration that government "cannot take from a property owner
the core economic value of the property"' 20 was also a usefully
broad characterization of how courts view the issue and helped to
frame the inquiry.
The court's sifting through the meanings of "permanent"
and "temporary" was entirely consistent with the analytical methods employed in takings jurisprudence. Such analysis also fits
within the court's broad authority to engage in an ad hoc factual
inquiry. 121
Admittedly, the necessary facts to determine whether EPA's
actions rose to the level of a regulatory taking were not present
before the court. 1 22 The Hendler II court, however, failed to pro123
vide the lower court with any significant direction on remand.
118. Id. at 1371-74. For a discussion of the court's analysis in this area, see
supra notes 7-36, 41-56 and accompanying text.
119. Hendler II, 952 F.2d at 1373. For a further discussion of the proper
time frame for the calculation of damages, see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
120. Hendler II, 952 F.2d at 1373.
121. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
122. Hendler11, 952 F.2d at 1375. The court held that the plaintiffs failed at
any level to plead sufficient facts with regard to the economic impact of the regulation as required by Agins. Id.
123. Id. at 1374-75. For example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
remanded a regulatory takings case and supplied the district court with several
factors to aid it in its decision. Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (11 th Cir.
1992). The Reahard court acknowledged the questions as:
(1) [T]he history of the property-when was it purchased? How much
land was purchased? Where was the land located? What was the nature of title? What was the composition of the land and how was it
initially used?; (2) the history of development-what was built on the
property and by whom? How was it subdivided and to whom was it
sold? What plats were filed? What roads were dedicated?; (3) the history of zoning and regulation-how and when was the land classified?
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The area of regulatory takings was acknowledged as a quagmire, 12 4 yet it was not apparent which, if any, of the various constructs the lower court should apply. The court hinted at a Penn
Central analysis, with the convoluted mentioning of the three factors, 2 5 but its expression of dismay in not having economic fac26
tors to examine implied a two-pronged Agins review.1
In addition, the court's examination of EPA's Order as possibly being a taking on its face was puzzling.' 27 The court's model
of property as a bundle of rights squares with the Supreme
Court's current view, which has been labeled "conceptual sever29
ance."' 2 8 Despite such a strong critique of the lower court,
How was use proscribed? What changes in classifications occurred?;
(4) how did development change when title passed?; (5) what is the
present nature and extent of the property?; (6) what were the reasonable expectations of the landowner under state common law?; (7) what
were the reasonable expectations of neighboring landowners under
state common law?; and (8) perhaps most importantly, what was the
diminution in the investment-backed expectations of the landowner, if
any, after the passage of the regulation?
Id. at 1136.
124. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1371. The court described the issues arising
under regulatory taking as not fitting easily into the simple framework of traditional takings. Id. The court also acknowledged that no set formula exists in the
area. Id. at 1373. For a complete discussion of takings jurisprudence, see supra
notes 7-57 and accompanying text.
125. Hendler 1I, 952 F.2d at 1375. The court asserted that
[the lower court's] ruling says nothing about whether subsequent
events, in light of the character of the Government's action and plaintiffs' distinct investment-backed expectations, might have had sufficient
economic impact on the plaintiffs to constitute a regulatory taking.
Given the fact-specific findings required for determining under current
regulatory takings law when such a taking occurs, we understand the
trial judge to have refrained from deciding this issue on summary judgment. It remains an issue in the case.
Id. The court, however, failed to discuss the issue of regulatory takings as it
would apply to the facts of the instant case.
126. Id. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980). For a
discussion of Agins, see supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
127. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1375.
128. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in
the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988). Conceptual severance "consists of delineating a property interest of just what the government
action has removed from the owner, and then asserting that that particular
whole thing has been permanently taken." Id. at 1676; see also Michelman, supra
note 41, at 1614-21. The Supreme Court has also considered the concept and
embraced it on several occasions. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (characterizing right to exclude as one such severable interest); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 164
(holding that taking occurred even though several aspects of property owner's
rights remained unaffected by government intrusion). But see Keystone, 480 U.S.
at 497-502 (property owner's various property rights viewed as whole in computation of diminution in value); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)
("[W]here an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction
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this opinion provided absolutely no basis for why EPA's Order
30
did not constitute a taking.I
While the court's regulatory takings analysis' 3' leaves something to be desired, its application of traditional physical takings
analysis was straightforward, succinct, and consistent with
Supreme Court rulings which have endorsed Loretto.13 2 The thorough discussion of the distinction between permanent and temporary takings' 3 3 was refreshingly clear and unequivocal. The
approach of placing the concept in perspective by discussing both
the recent thrust of Loretto and the historical protection of the
right to exclude worked well in framing the discussion. The court
bolstered its opinion by placing more than the ten year tradition
of Loretto behind its appraisal.' 3 4 Additionally helpful in outlining
the debate was the court's declaration that permanence does not
mean forever and could involve a limited term.' 3 5 This clarification removed a very basic ambiguity that prior cases have failed to
do.
The common sense approach 3 6 taken by the court, however,
has both positive and negative implications. The fact-based approach honors the ad hoc tradition applied in regulatory takings
38
analysis 13 7 as well as logically recognizing that such intrusions'
constitute a taking. Negatively, the simplification into hypothetiof one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety.").
129. Hendler II, 952 F.2d at 1374-75. For further discussion of the court's
critique of the lower court's analysis, see supra notes 85-95.
130. Id. at 1375. The court noted that:
The question addressed ...in Hendler I was whether that Order, standing alone, met the tests for a regulatory taking. The court concluded
no. On the facts then before the court, and in light of the absence by
plaintiffs of proof of facts addressed specifically to the tests for a regulatory taking based on the Order alone, we do not disagree with that
ruling.
Id.
131. Id. at 1374-75.
132. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992); City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 779 (1988); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986).
133. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1375-77.
134. Id. at 1375-77. The court cited three older Supreme Court cases for
support: Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States
v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373 (1945).
135. Hendler II, 952 F.2d at 1376.
136. Id. at 1375-78.
137. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10 (1988); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981); Kaiser

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol4/iss2/8

20

Remphrey: Hendler v. United States: Preserving Private Property Rights in t

1993]

HENDLER V. UNITED STATES

485

cals 13 9 does not leave future courts with any guidance and, like
the determination that the Order was not a taking,' 40 was conclusory. ' 4 t The nearly exclusive reliance on Loretto for the finding
of a physical taking was troublesome in that Loretto did not offer
42
the ironclad black letter law that the court suggested.
The court's use of Nollan and Kaiser Aetna to demonstrate that
the periodic intrusions of government officials and equipment
constitute a physical taking was risky.' 43 In Nollan and Kaiser
Aetna, the Supreme Court analyzed the government's actions not
as physical takings but as regulatory takings.' 44 While the court
properly applied these concepts, the distinguishing factors of
what kind of taking was involved may cause this case to be
ignored.
VI.

THE IMPACT OF HENDLER V. UNITED STATES

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning follows the
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
138. For a description of the wells placed on Hendler's property, see supra
note 65.
139. For a discussion of the examples given by the court, see supra notes
104-05 and accompanying text.
140. For further discussion of the court's ruling on this point, see supra
notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
141. See Hendler 11, 952 F.2d at 1378. The court pointed out that:
The issue before the court in Hendler I was whether, on the facts before
it, the Government took any property by permanent physical occupation, thus obligating it to pay plaintiffs just compensation. The trial
judge thought not, absent more facts; we think nothing more needed to
be shown. The trial judge denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on this point; he should have granted it.
Id.
142. The Supreme Court itself has been careful to note the limited scope of
Loretto. See, e.g., FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251 (1987) (declaring holding in Loretto as "very narrow"); Kaufman v. City of New York, 717 F.
Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting Loretto based on its narrow scope); Gibbs v.
Southeastern Inv. Corp., 705 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D. Conn. 1989) (explaining
Loretto's holding is "very narrow"); American Continental Corp. v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct. 692, 701 (1991) ("Loretto cannot, and should not, be extended
by mere analogy without careful analysis.").
Critics have also scrutinized the Loretto decision. See, e.g., Douglas W.
Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1658 (1988) (viewing Loretto as destroying distinction between physical and regulatory takings); Radin, supra note 128, at 1676-78 (criticizing Loretto for expanding scope of takings).
143. Hendler 11, 952 F.2d at 1377-78. For a further discussion of the court's
use of these cases, see supra notes 88-91 & 109-11 and accompanying text.
144. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 172. For a discussion
of these two cases, see supra notes 24-29 & 43-49.
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Supreme Court's lead in finding compensation due to property
owners when the government physically intrudes upon their
property. Unfortunately, the Hendler II decision leaves lower
courts without a concrete test for what constitutes such a taking.' 45 The court's examination employed various elements of
takings jurisprudence, but lacked sufficient clarity for lower courts
to apply.
The court's attempt to balance the conflicting positive values
of private autonomy and governmental need for intrusion for the
benefit of society' 4 6 was admirable. However, the result is to provide government with less incentive to actively patrol and monitor
critical environmental developments. Such reluctance is likely because government must fear liability for compensation to property owners whenever its duties mandate entry onto private
property. Government agencies must also consider potential
legal costs in battling takings decisions, even if they are successful
in fighting off a private citizen's challenge. Such disincentives to
ardent environmental regulation undermine holistic attempts to
regulate the environment.1 4 7 Indeed, the focus of the courts' inquiries is on only one plot of land at a time.' 48 Moreover, the
145. See, e.g.,
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
(ruling government easement constituted physical intrusion); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that installation of cable television equipment was physical intrusion); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (ruling navigable servitude was physical intrusion). Legal scholars have debated the merits of a bright-line test versus an
ad hoc approach. See Michelman, supra note 42, at 1625-29 (arguing in favor of
ad hoc method); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on
Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697 (1988) (criticizing ad hoc approach); Frank
Michelman, A Reply to Susan Rose-Ackerman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1712 (1988) (rebutting Rose-Ackerman).
Six months after Hendler II was decided, the Supreme Court further expanded its deference to property owners in the area of regulatory takings. Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). In Lucas, changes in
the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act barred the owner of a beachfront parcel from developing his land. Id. at 2889. This prohibition denied Lucas all economically beneficial uses of the land, namely the development of
resort residences, and thus constituted a taking. Id. at 2895.
146. Hendler H, 952 F.2d at 1376-77.
147. David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Callfor Judicial
Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REV. 311 (1988). Hunter argues for a more ecologically concerned approach
to takings jurisprudence. Id. at 311. Hunter states that because of the finite
nature of the planet, constraints are placed upon our property-based economic
freedoms and development. Id. at 314-15. A clamor is made for a rethinking of
our property concepts to conform to changing environmental values and needs.
Id. at 316-17.
148. Id. at 334; see also T. Nicholaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and
Justice, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1714, 1729 (1988) ("When we have achieved an un-
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economic thrust of the courts' analysis, while constitutionally
149
sound, may not be ecologically sound.
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority in Mahon, stated,
"Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law."' 50 In order for government to go on acting as the chief protector and insurer of safe
drinking water, the per se taking analysis performed in Hendler II
should be abandoned. The perilous environmental threat in Hend/er H distinguishes it from the other cases where courts found in
favor of private property rights. Hendler H is a victory for property owners who are invaded by governmental agencies, but ultimately Hendler H may be a defeat for environmental policy and us
all.
William E. Remphrey, Jr.
derstanding that land and natural resources are our common heritage, there will
be no problems of governmental actions taking these things.").
149. Hunter, supra note 147, at 321. This view of property
in exploitative
terms fosters "unchecked growth and development over stewardship and conservation." Id. at 332.
150. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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